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The Unresolved Interpretive
Ambiguity of Patent Claims
Oskar Liivak*
Claims are at the heart of every major patent related issue. Most
importantly, they determine a patent's potent rights of exclusion. Yet, we
cannot predict how courts will set the exact boundaries of claims. This
renders smooth operation of the patent system near impossible. For some
time, scholars have theorized that a basic policy disagreement is a source
of this uncertainty. Some judges favor narrower patents, some favor
broader and judges will naturally tend toward their policy preference.
Policy disagreements result in claim uncertainty. Recently, scholars TunJen Chiang and Lawrence Solum have taken this view further arguing that
this policy debate is the only problem preventing clear and consistent
understanding of patent claims. That position is premature; there is
another unnoticed and somewhat antecedent source of confusion. Patent
law has not made clear what a patent claim (for lack of a better verb)
claims. Patent applicants are surely delineating a boundary with their
claims but patent law has not made clear what we are drawing the
boundary around. When we write claims, exactly what question are we
supposed to be answering? It is not clear whether a claim in a patent
applicationis the statement "I claim to have invented the following things"
or instead the request "I would like to claim exclusionary dominion over
the following things." These are different in kind. Unfortunately both
understandings have doctrinal support and both are operating
simultaneously yet confusingly in patent law today. The proper way to
handle patent claims depends on which view is correct. The uncertainty
and disagreements that are plaguing patent law can be explained not just
as a policy dispute but instead as confusion over this basic understanding
of patent claims. This article outlines these two conflicting views, their
* Copyright © 2016 Oskar Liivak. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The
author thanks a number of people for helpful discussions and comments including
Tun-Jen Chiang, Kevin E. Collins, Christopher Cotropia, Mark Lemley, Jakob
Sherkow, and Lawrence Solum.
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implications for patent law and how we should resolve the ambiguity.
Correctly understood, though claims are central in determining exclusion,
we should nonetheless interpret initial patent claims as the statement "I
claim to have invented the following things."
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INTRODUCTION

Claims are at the heart of almost every critical question in patent
law. Most notably claims determine a patent's rights of exclusion.' Yet,
despite their importance, there is no reliable way to determine the
ultimate boundaries of a patent. 2 During litigation, these claim-based
boundaries can be pushed and pulled dramatically.3 The result is a
system that is hard to predict and appears judge-dependent4 Recent
scholarship has argued that this uncertainty results from an
unresolved policy debate about the proper substantive scope of patent
exclusion. Some judges favor narrower patents, some favor broader. In
other words, the fight over how broadly a patent should exclude drives
uncertainty. Divergent policy preferences produce varied case
outcomes. Recent scholarship by Tun-Jen Chiang and Lawrence
Solum has taken this argument further and has argued that this policy
dispute is the only problem impacting claims.5 If patent law would
only resolve the policy debate over patent scope, then, patent
boundaries would become workable and clear. 6 This policy debate
certainly exists and it contributes to the uncertainty but it is not the
only problem.
What has not been recognized is that there is also confusion over
the fundamental meaning of claims. There is a question over how we

I R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 123, 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013)
(understanding claims is the "critical patent issue in litigation").
2 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM.

& TECH. L. REV. 243, 246-47

(2014)

[hereinafter Judicial Capacities] (compiling list of issues caused by claim uncertainty
including "causing exante unpredictability before litigation, ex-post uncertainly in
litigation, appellate panel dependence, high reversal rates, conflicting interpretive
approaches, overly broad claim scope, undue formalism, increased litigation,
disincentives to settle, and high litigation costs").
3 See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 102-03 (2005); Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015
MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 899.
4 Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1353, 1353 (2014) ("Uncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant
problem facing the patent system ....
[U]ncertainty has long been blamed on the
Federal Circuit's rules for interpreting claims, the short summaries at the end of the
patent that define the patentee's exclusive rights.").
5 Tun-Jen
Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinctionin Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 537 (2013).
6 See id. at 537-38.
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should interpret patent claims. 7 Patent law has not clarified exactly
what the patent applicant is communicating via claims. Applicants are
surely delineating a boundary with their claims. But, a boundary about
what? In particular, it is not clear whether we should understand
claims in the sense of the representation "I claim to have invented the
following things" or in the sense of the request "I would like to claim
exclusionary dominion over the following things." There is a
difference in kind between these two views and the difference impacts
how we should interpret claims. The former is a representation by the
inventor about what she claims to have invented and it can be proven
to be true or false. The latter is just a request for exclusion; it is not a
statement that is true or false. Importantly, in both views, claims will
be central in determining the scope of exclusion but how we move
from claim text to exclusion differs. 8 In critical areas, the procedure
for handling claims will differ significantly.
In fact, the varied case outcomes that have been attributed to the
unresolved policy debate can alternatively be explained as resulting
from this unrecognized interpretive confusion. In particular, patent
cases have split on the proper use of the patent specification to
understand claims. 9 As argued below, these differing case outcomes
can be explained as an unstated disagreement about the fundamental
meaning of patent claims and not necessarily the result of policy
differences.
Understandably, it might seem surprising that such a fundamental
ambiguity could still exist in patent law. After all, patent claims have
been part of the U.S. patent system for over a hundred and fifty years.
Yet, the principal legal sources that govern patent claims give
conflicting instructions to patent applicants. The statute directs the
7 See id. (providing an extended discussion of interpretation versus construction).
8 As explained more thoroughly below, in both views claims still determine the
bounds of exclusion but they do so in differing ways and for somewhat differing
reasons. Longer versions of the alternate interpretive messages are "I claim to have
invented the following things and, if you (the PTO) determine that my claimed
invention is patentable, meaning that it is new, non-obvious, and properly disclosed,
then award me exclusive rights over my claimed invention." or "I am requesting a
claim of exclusive rights over the following things and if you (the PTO) find that what
I have claimed is new and nonobvious and the breadth of the claim is commensurate
with the teachings found in my specification then please grant me the exclusive rights
I have requested." In the former, the claim defines the scope of exclusion because a
valid claim covers the patentable parts of the inventor's invention. In the latter, the
claim defines exclusion directly because in this view a valid claim is one that the PTO
has determined to be allowable under the requirements of patentability. In this view, a
valid claim is a requested claim of exclusion that has been granted. See infra Part I.
9 Reilly,Judicial Capacities,supra note 2, at 260-61.
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patent applicant to include "one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor...
regards as the invention."10 That instruction seems to clearly align
with the view that claims are to be understood as "I claim to have
invented the following." Yet, despite that statutory instruction, the
courts have described claims in ways that appear to favor the alternate
view. They have emphasized "the bedrock principle of patent law" that
the claims define a patent's rights of exclusion. 1 Numerous cases go
on to analogize claims as the metes and bounds of patent exclusion.
Indeed, a highly regarded hornbook emphasizes that claims
"determine the scope of the right to exclude, regardless of what the
inventor invented."' 12 Relying on these sources as defining the
interpretive meaning of claims leads to understanding patent claims as
the request "I would like to claim exclusion over the following." In
short, both views have support in the law but they are conflicting and
lead to differences in procedure, most notably differences in their
reliance on the patent specification.
When understood as "I would like to claim exclusionary dominion
over the following things," then the rest of the patent specification has
little to do with interpreting the claims. In this understanding, claims
are meant to directly communicate the boundaries of the requested
exclusion. That is their sole purpose. They are just a request and are
not a representation by the inventor of what he or she invented. In this
view, the plain meaning of the claim language dominates as the
applicant is simply trying to communicate a boundary of exclusion
directly to a person of skill in the art. To interpret such a claim, a
judge just asks the question "how much real estate was the applicant
requesting when she wrote this particular claim?" Context from the
specification is largely irrelevant unless the patentee specifically gives
a claim term a specific definition. A significant wing of the Federal
Circuit emphasizes this plain meaning interpretation. As mentioned
above, previous scholars have argued that this plain meaning
understanding results from a policy preference for broader claims.
That indeed may be the case, but, as argued here, that same
interpretive focus on plain meaning can also result simply from

1035 U.S.C.
11

§ 112(b) (2012).
See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,

1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Aro Mfg., Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365
U.S. 336, 339 (1961) ("[Tlhe claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the
grant.")).
12 JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAW 67 (3rd ed. 2009) (quoting remarks by Judge
Giles S. Rich).
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understanding claims as the request "I would like to claim exclusion
over the following."
In contrast, if instead claims are understood as the statement "I
claim to have invented the following things," then the specification is
always relevant for interpreting the claims. In this view, the claims and
the rest of the specification focus on the same thing - the invention.
Analogizing to real property, the specification describes the things that
exist within a piece of land while claims focus on the boundaries of
that land. Context from the rest of specification can always help to
interpret the boundaries of what the applicant claims to have invented.
Indeed, a number of judges on the Federal Circuit favor heavy use of
the specification for interpreting claims. And, this reliance on the
specification, rather than necessarily resulting from a policy preference
for narrower patents, can be the result of simply trying to interpret
claims according to the view that they represent the statement "I claim
to have invented the following." The use of the specification may
result, not from molding claim scope to some policy preference, but
rather from an earnest attempt to understand what the applicant was
trying to communicate via that claim.
Such fundamental questions about the basic nature of patent claims
cannot continue to exist if we hope to make progress toward fixing the
patent system. Currently, patent law has not even acknowledged that
there might be this problem. In fact, prominent scholars have taken
strong positions that interpretive ambiguity is not a problem. 13 This is
unfortunate and worrisome. Claims are too important for such an
ambiguity to remain unresolved. The proper understanding of
important issues, like the use of the specification for claim
interpretation and, as argued below, the proper use of functional
claiming, all hinge on this debate.
One hopeful fact is that though ambiguity does indeed today cloud
patent discourse, once highlighted, such ambiguities should be easier
to resolve than larger policy disagreements. As argued by Solum and
Chiang, as to interpretive ambiguity, "there is in fact a single correct
meaning to the text when viewed in context."' 14 In short, once we
recognize this ambiguity, then the courts simply need to clarify which
view is correct. But, until we do so, there will not be clear patent
discourse because patent applicants are getting mixed messages as to
what they should be communicating with their claims.

13 See Chiang & Solum, supranote 5, at 537.
14 Id. at 592.

2016]

The Unresolved Interpretive Ambiguity of Patent Claims

1857

In the following sections these issues are explored in more detail. Part
I outlines some basics about patent claims and the existing debate about
substantive claim scope. Part II then argues that there is an alternate
explanation for the judicial disagreements. Claim meaning is also
ambiguous. There are two distinct, conflicting ways to understand the
exact message that a claim conveys. Part II then goes on to resolve the
ambiguity by arguing that claims are best understood in the sense of "I
claim to have invented the following things." In particular, this part
argues that this understanding follows from the statute whereas the
alternative view requires a deeply atextual understanding of it. Lastly,
Part III develops the implications of this ambiguity (and its proper
resolution) for a number of important emerging areas of patent law like
indefiniteness, appellate review of claims, and functional claiming.
I.

CLAIMS AND THE PATENT DOCUMENT

At the highest level of generality, the United States patent system is
designed to fulfill its constitutional mission "To promoting the
Progress of ...

useful Arts" by "securing for limited Times to...

Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries." 15 The patent
system gives inventors exclusive rights in exchange for inventions.
The process for receiving these exclusive rights starts with the patent
application, the core of which is the patent specification.16 The
contents of the specification are defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)-(b).
The applicant is first instructed to provide "a written description of
the invention" as well as "[how] to make and use [that invention]. '"17
This written description is the quid pro quo of the patent system. The
inventor discloses the invention in detail to prove that they did in fact
invent something and so that others can later reproduce and use it. In
return, the inventor gets (for a limited time) valuable exclusive rights.
When the patent expires, the public (via the teachings found in the
specification) can freely use the invention. That is the public's quid the description of the invention.
After providing this description, the patent document turns to the
inventor's quo - the exclusive rights. Patent applicants are instructed
to "conclude" the specification with "one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
15
16

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
As enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). The applicant is required to supply

three things: an oath, drawings ("where necessary for the understanding of the subject
matter sought to be patented"), and the specification. 35 U.S.C. § 113 (2012).
17 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
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inventor . . . regards as the invention." 18 It is in meeting this
requirement that the claims first enter the picture. They are the most
important part of the patent document. As held by the Supreme Court,
the claims are used to define the extent of the exclusive rights. 19
20
Claims "are the sole measure of the grant."
Because of this tight relation to a patent's exclusionary rights, a
court's determination of the extent of the claims is critical to every
case. If construed narrowly enough, the defendant wins by noninfringement while the plaintiff wins if construed broadly. 2 ' This allimportant claim construction often takes place in so-called Markman
hearings, named after the Supreme Court case that held that claim
construction is strictly a question of law for the judge to decide. 22 A
court's Markman determination is often outcome determinative. As a
result, patent litigators focus incredible amounts of attention on this
pushing and pulling of the claim boundaries. 23 As put by Judge Giles
24
Rich, the "name of the game is the claims."
For claim construction, one critical question, which is hardly new,
is the role of the specification for understanding claims. 25 The central
issue is whether and how the examples described in the specification
should be used to interpret (and perhaps limit) patent claims. 2 6 Should
claims hew close to the explicitly disclosed technological examples in

18 Id.

19 See Aro Mfg., Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339-40

(1961).
20 Id. at 339.
21 The story is a bit more complicated than this as defendants can also win with a
broad construction if the patent claim is then found invalid. This dynamic leads to

Judge Rich's famous and initially counter intuitive statement that "The stronger a
patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger it is." See Giles S. Rich,
The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644
(1967). This only underscores how important claim construction is for all aspects of
patent law.
22 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,372 (1996).
23 See Rantanen, supra note 3, at 899.
24 Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims - American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).

25 See, e.g., Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 157 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) (No. 3,645)
("The counsel for the plaintiff seem disposed to consider ... the subsequent more
particular description, as merely an illustration of the general principle, as one mode
of carrying it into execution."); see also Phillips v. AWlH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("The role of the specification in claim construction has
been an issue in patent law decisions in this country for nearly two centuries.").
26 See Oskar Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 57, 73-74 (2012)
[hereinafter FindingInvention].
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the specification or can the claims (and therefore patent exclusion)
extend further?
Ten years ago in Phillips v. AWH, an en banc Federal Circuit did
clarify some issues. 27 One line of cases had put heavy emphasis on
dictionaries as the first source to be consulted in claim
interpretation. 28 Implicitly, the specification (and inferences drawn
therein) was of less probative value than dictionaries. Phillips
overruled that line of cases and demoted dictionaries to an extrinsic
source that should be consulted only when intrinsic sources (like the
specification) failed to provide conclusive answers. 29 Yet Phillips
(perhaps intentionally to maintain consensus) left significant
questions open. 30 The role of the specification is still up for grabs. In
particular, two competing canons of claim interpretation exemplified
this divide. On the one hand, claims were to be understood in light of
the specification. 31 On the other hand, judges were to avoid one of the
"cardinal sins of patent law - reading a limitation from the written
description into the claims." 3 2 Phillips noted that the distinction
between the two "can be a difficult one to apply in practice" 33 but that
it "can be discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the
court's focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill
in the art would understand the claim terms." 34 Yet, despite this
hopeful prediction, these competing canons of interpretation have not
been reconciled and overall claim construction remains "as divided
today as before Phillips." 35 Patent law is still divided over the proper
role of specification for understanding patent claims. Should we focus
on the plain meaning of the claim terms generally or should we focus
on the meaning of claim terms in the context of the specific invention
described in the specification?36
27 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303.

28 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir.
2002).

See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18.
See Reilly, Judicial Capacities, supra note 2, at 261 (2014) ("Unfortunately,
Phillips attempted to reconcile all prior cases, rather than overruling one of the
competing lines, and thus can be read as supporting either side of the methodological
split.").
31 Id.
32 Phillips, 415 F.3d. at 1320 (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
33 Id. at 1323.
34 Id.
35 Reilly, Judicial Capacities, supra note 2, at 261 (emphasis added).
36 Id. ("[Tihe core question uniting all of these various descriptions is whether
29

30
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After Phillips emerged, patent scholars began integrating it into the
broader patent landscape. For example, Chris Cotropia identified
these alternate canons as leading to broad or narrow claims and he
matched them with policy preferences. 3 7 Heavy use of the specification
would generally lead to narrow claims while focus on the plain
meaning (avoiding importing limitations from the specification)
would generally lead to broader claims. Cotropia argued that choosing
between these interpretive methodologies could be seen as a policy
choice for broad or narrow claims. 38 Interpretive methodology then
should be seen as an important "policy lever" that judges could deploy
to achieve their policy objectives.

39

In a recent article Lawrence Solum and Tun-Jen Chiang take up that
idea and argue that "uncertainty in claim application most typically arises
because judges have core policy disagreements about the underlying goals
of claim construction." 40 And, I agree that this is a source of
unpredictability. But, Solum and Chiang go on to argue at length that this
policy based disagreement is the exclusive source of confusion. They
argue that there is no interpretive ambiguity in claim language. 41 They
reach what they describe as the "clear" conclusion "that linguistic
uncertainty is not what is causing disputes in patent law, at least in the
main."42 Based on that conclusion, they argue that we should not waste
resources on claim interpretation because that is not problematic. Instead,
we must focus only on the policy debates surrounding optimal claim
scope. When those issues of construction are resolved, Solum and Chiang
43
argue then patent claims may start to stabilize.
But, if differing policy preferences are driving patent uncertainty,
then patent clarity may well be near impossible to achieve. First, there
is little evidence that we know what the right amount of patent
exclusion should be. It is in many ways the ultimate question in patent
claim terms should be given the general meaning they normally possess in the field of
the invention or the specific meaning with which they are used in the patent itself.").
37 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim InterpretationMethodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms,47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 127-28 (2005).
38 See id. at 133 ("Claim interpretation includes choices among available patent
scopes. These choices are made by selecting a particular claim interpretation
methodology.").
39 Id. at 58; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1670-73 (2003).
40 Chiang & Solum, supra note

5, at 534.
Id.
42 Id. at 605, 613 (concluding that "uncertainty about claim scope will persist
until judges reach normative agreement about claim analysis policy").
43 Id. at 613.
41
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law and to date it has eluded any real answer or even consensus. And
as such, it has been the focus of vigorous debate for decades. Ed
Kitch's seminal article from 1977 is generally regarded as advocating
for property-like protection for patents with broad claim scope that is
vigorously defended by strong patent remedies. 44 In 1990 Rob Merges
and Richard Nelson entered the fray by arguing for a role for
competition and therefore narrower patent rights.45 That debate

continues pushing and pulling patent theory between these two
poles. 46 In short, if patent law needs to resolve this debate before we
can hope to gain clarity over patent claims, then there is little hope
that patent scope can become more predictable anytime in the
foreseeable future.
I.

UNRESOLVED INTERPRETIVE AMBIGUITY

Certainly the unresolved policy debate about optimum patent scope
is problematic but perhaps there are other, easier to solve, problems
also causing confusion. Indeed, contrary to scholars like Solum and
Chiang, policy disputes are not the only issue; interpretive ambiguities
are also major contributing factors. Patent law appears to support two
distinct ways to understand patent claims. These two understandings
lead to different views on interpreting claims. And interestingly, these
differences mirror quite closely the current rift over the use of the
specification for understanding claims. As explained above, previous
scholarship has diagnosed the specification debate as a policy dispute
but this article suggests an alternative explanation. The specification
debate may be derived from differing views on the fundamental
meaning of claims.
This ambiguity exists because patent law has given unclear
instructions to patent drafters. It is not clear whether claims
(especially initial claims in the original application) are
communicating the boundaries of the real estate that the applicant
wants exclusive dominion over, or are they communicating the
boundaries of what the applicant claims to have invented. Differing
procedure emerges depending on which view is adopted. For example,
if we are to claim what we invented, then the rest of specification is
always highly relevant for interpreting the claim language. In contrast,
44 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 276-77 (1977).
45 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 916 (1990).
46 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1595.
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if we are claiming exclusion directly, then the specification is rarely
relevant for claim interpretation (though the specification will be still
relevant for the validity of that claim).
Once the ambiguity is recognized, the question is which view is
correct. After all, as recently argued, once ambiguity has been
identified, then "there is in fact a single correct meaning to the text
when viewed in context. '"47 This article argues that, when correctly
understood, claims should be understood as claiming what was
invented. Understanding claims as "what I would like to claim
exclusion over" requires a deeply atextual understanding of claims. It
requires elevating judicial statements about claims over the plain text
of the statute. As argued below, it requires conflating what claims do
with what claims communicate.
In contrast, understanding claims as "Iclaim to have invented the
following things" does not require such a strained reading and it is also
still consistent with the judicial opinions. The key to this consistency is
to understand that the statutory command defines the interpretive
meaning of claims while the judicial opinions describes the construed
effect of claims. The statute defines what claims are meant to
communicate while the judicial opinions are describing what claims do.
A.

Claim Ambiguity

The central argument in this paper is that there exists an ambiguity
in our understanding of patent claims. Importantly, this interpretive
ambiguity is separate from the policy debate concerning ultimate
patent scope. The latter is a matter of construction while the former is
a matter of interpretation. Asking whether a claim drafter is making a
request for exclusion with their claim or instead stating what they
claim to have invented is a matter of interpretation. It is asking what
the text of a claim is meant to communicate. To better understand the
difference between this policy debate and this interpretive confusion,
it is worth understanding Solum and Chiang's distinction between
interpretation and construction.
Prior to bringing the interpretation versus construction distinction
to patent law, Prof. Solum explored the distinction more generally.
The first step, interpretation, is largely a policy-free exercise that aims
to understand and resolve ambiguities in the text. The aim of
interpretation is to understand the message the author intends to
convey to the reader via the text. The aim is to understand the "set of
ideas and concepts that are communicated by the language to a
47 Chiang & Solum, supra note 5, at 592.
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member of the intended audience." 48 In particular, for interpretation,
they focus on the "speaker's meaning," a concept formulated by Paul
Grice as "the meaning that the speaker intends to convey to the
audience based on the audience's recognition of the speaker's
communicative intention." 49 As they define it, interpretation is
"ultimately" the search for "the understanding of the intended
audience."50

Having interpreted the text, the next step is construction. This
entails determining the legal effect of the text. And although
interpretation and its linguistic meaning often provide a good start
toward legal effect, linguistic meaning may not answer all relevant
questions. To make up that gap, the legal authority often must rely on
policy-based considerations to answer these remaining questions of
vagueness. As they explain, "[clonstruction is the activity of
determining the legal meaning and effect of a text." 51 It is the "thickly
normative" process of moving from the linguistic meaning of a text to
52
rendering a legal decision with actual impact on legal actors.
By separating these tasks, they argue that increased transparency
results. The interpretation-construction distinction forces legal
authorities to be more open and upfront that indeed at least part of
their legal determination is based on their policy judgments. Use of the
distinction prevents legal authorities from hiding behind all-too-easy
to blame linguistic ambiguity. Ultimately, they state that
The interpretation-construction distinction does not tell us
how to resolve these disputes over legal effect. Rather, the
payoff of drawing the distinction is antecedent: it tells us
which issues are problems of linguistic meaning, and which
issues are problems of legal effect. This is important because
the two types of problems call for different solutions. 53
To better understand the claim ambiguity that is the focus of this
article, consider an analogous ambiguity in a hypothetical tax system.
Assume that congress has set federal income tax at "a fair amount
around 10% of annual income." On a policy level we could imagine
debating the meaning of "fair amount." Some might argue for placing
tight bounds on IRS discretion and thus creating something akin to a
48

Id. at 546-47.

49

Id. at 552 n.79.

50

Id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
See id. at 554.
Id. at 535.

51
52

53
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flat tax of 10%. Others might disagree and would argue that a "fair
amount" demands a progressive tax with an increasing tax rate for
wealthier filers. The statutory command of a "fair amount" is vague.
To assign tax liability, the IRS must resolve that vagueness by making
a policy choice. Under Solum and Chiang's definitions, this policy
choice by the IRS is an act of construction.
If all else were perfectly clear in that tax system, then indeed
perhaps the only real debate would be this policy question. But,
consider now another source of confusion. In addition to the
substantive debate over how much tax congress intended, imagine a
separate procedural choice over how to implement such a system. In
particular, imagine implementing the above tax system using two
different tax forms. In both, the tax filer is asked to provide a detailed
description of the filer's income for the past year. This is analogous to
patent law's requirement to provide a detailed description of the
54
invention.
In addition to that detailed report on income, assume that the tax
forms conclude with one of two different questions. One tax form asks
the tax filers to conclude by answering the question, "What is 10% of
your annual income?" In other words, after providing a detailed
description of their income, the form asks the filer to help the IRS by
summing together all the income and to report 10% of that total
annual income. This last answer on this form is a factual statement
whose truth can be checked by corroborating with the facts reported
in the rest of the tax filing. The tax filer is not asked to suggest or
comment on what might constitute a "fair amount." In this system, the
filer just reports 10% of their income as a factual matter and the IRS is
left to determine whether that actual tax liability (i.e. the "fair
amount" approximately 10% of income) is above or below that
amount.
Now imagine an alternative way to implement this tax system.
Imagine that in this alternative system the tax form still asks for a
detailed report of actual income but it concludes by asking filers to
instead "state what would be a fair amount of tax to pay that is around
10% of your annual income." Here the filer is not making a
representation as to their actual annual income. The answer to this
question here is simply what the filer thinks would be a fair amount.
This is a difference in kind from the response to the other form. There
is no truth or falsity to this statement in the way that an answer to the
question "what was 10% of your income?" could be either true or

54

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).

2016]

The Unresolved Interpretive Ambiguity of Patent Claims

1865

false. And of course, filers would have a strong incentive to argue that,
in their opinion, a "fair" amount would be lower (perhaps much
lower) than 10% of their income.
There is nothing inherently wrong with either of these two
procedural systems as long as we all understand which system is in
operation. Note also that internal procedure at the IRS will differ
between these two systems. In the former, the filer reports a number
that is 10% of their actual annual income and the IRS must determine
if this is an accurate representation and then must determine what
would be a fair amount (near 10%) to pay in tax. In contrast, in the
latter system, the applicant themselves takes the initial stab at
suggesting what would constitute a fair amount. And, in this system,
the IRS needs to decide whether to give that initial stab any weight.
Because different information is being asked for, there are procedural
differences. Either form could be used successfully as long as filers and
the IRS all know which form is used.
It would be inconceivable that the tax system could run smoothly if
tax returns arrived without the IRS being able to tell which of the two
questions the filer was trying to answer. But this is exactly the
confusion that exists today in patent law - this is the type of
ambiguity that is plaguing patent law. There is confusion over the
exact question that patent claims are meant to answer. Are we
claiming what we invented or claiming what we would like exclusive
dominion over? As long as this ambiguity exists, there cannot be clear
communication in patent law.
B.

Claiming Desired Exclusion

Of the two views of patent claims, most of the patent community
appears to understand patents in the sense of "I would like to claim
exclusive dominion over the following things." And, although this
article argues that this is the incorrect understanding, we might excuse
the majority, as there are abundant citations that appear to support
their view. None other than Judge Giles Rich, one of the principal
drafters of the 1952 Patent Act, has made this notion quite explicit:
when all is said and done and the court has spoken, what is it
that the claims point out? What the inventors invented? Or
the scope of the invention? Not likely! It is the claims that
have determined what infringes the patentee's right to exclude,
construed in the light of the specification .... [Tihe claims
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are the measure of the patentee's right to exclude rather than
55
the measure of what was invented.
And these sentiments have made their way into the patent law
orthodoxy. 56 In her well-received hornbook, Janice Mueller describes a
patent claim as "a single-sentence definition of the scope of the patent
owner's property right - that is, her right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the invention, in
this country." 57 She goes on to emphasize that claims "determine the
invented.
scope of the right to exclude, regardless of what the inventor
58
I submit that that is the sole function of patent claims."
In their highly influential article on claim scope, Rob Merges and
Richard Nelson also appear to adopt this view of claims as relating
only to exclusion. They note that "[tihe specification and claims serve
quite different functions." In particular, they state that
[tihe ...

specification ...

is written like a brief science or

engineering article describing the problem the inventor faced
and the steps she took to solve it ....

The second part of the

patent application is a set of claims, which usually encompass
more than the material set out in the specification. Claims
define what the inventor considers to be the scope of her
invention, the technological territory she claims is hers to
control

by

suing

for

infringement ....

[Claims

are]

59
[a]nalogous to the metes and bounds of a real property deed.

Relatedly, Jeanne Fromer highlights that the technical layer of the
patent (the specification) is not the same as the legal layer (the
claims).60 And, even in their casebook, Rob Merges and John Duffy
emphasize that "claims are the essence of the legal right granted by a
patent"; they are "the portion of the patent document that defines the
patentee's rights." 61 They add that "numerous cases analogize claims
55 Giles S. Rich, Foreword to
at iii, vi (2d ed. 2001).

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW,

56 For criticism of the reflexive acceptance of these statements, see Oskar Liivak,
Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6-16 (2012)

[hereinafter Rescuing Invention].
57 MUELLER, supra note 12, at 66.
58 Id. at 67 (quoting remarks by Judge Giles S. Rich).
59 Merges & Nelson, supra note 45, at 844-45.
60 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 566 (2009) ("The
legal scope of the patent right is not the same as a technical understanding of the
patented invention.").
61 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 26
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to the 'metes and bounds' of a real property deed," 62 noting that "[t]he
function of claims is only to define the precise scope of the intellectual
property rights that are warranted by the disclosure made earlier in the
specification. "63
Tun-Jen Chiang provides perhaps the clearest support for
understanding claims as self-serving requests for real estate. 64 Chiang
tries to distinguish the specification from the claims. He argues that
"the specification describes an invention in the sense of an
embodiment, while the claim describes an invention in the sense of
monopoly scope." 65 He goes on to emphasize his "key insight.., that
patent law has two separate concepts of 'the invention,' and the two
parts of the patent describe entirely different things at a conceptual
level." 66 Though the specification describes concrete embodiments,
Chiang sees the claims as delineating something quite different.
Claims are requests for exclusion and nothing else. 67
1. Implications for Patent Procedure
If we adopt this view, then a number of procedural implications
result. In particular, under this view, claims should be understood
principally by their plain meaning to persons of skill in the art. After
all, as delineating a boundary of exclusion, the claim language is
speaking directly to a person of skill and it is not directly referencing
the detailed embodiments in the rest of the specification. With this
view, there will only be a limited role for the specification in
interpreting the claims. The specification is relevant later for
determining the validity of a claim but it is not generally needed for
interpretation of the claims.
(4th ed. 2007) (quoting Markman v. Westview, 517 U.S. 370,372 (1996)).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Tun-Jen Chiang, ForcingPatent Claims, 113 MicH. L. REV. 513, 515-16 (2015).
65 Id. at 518.
66 Id. at 520.
67 See id. at 546-47. From this perspective though, Chiang describes a "puzzle." As
claims are just requests for exclusion, Chiang argues that applicants will surely draft
claims to "cover as much as they can possibly get away with." He argues that
"[r]equiring patentees to write claims forces them ... to disclose ... private
information" that establishes "an initial baseline" from which to start a more
meaningful exchange with the PTO and courts. Chiang argues that patent claims serve
a purpose akin to opening bids in some negotiation that reveals bounds on private
valuation. Certainly where a seller sets an initial asking price and the prospective
buyer similarly sets their initial price, this sets the stage for the ongoing negotiation.
Id. at 518, 522, 558.
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If understood as request for exclusion, then the job of the PTO is to
determine whether the applicant's requests should be granted. For
this, the PTO refers to the requirements of the patent statute: novelty,
non-obviousness, and disclosure. An applicant cannot be granted
exclusive dominion over anything that already resides in the prior art
or anything that is obvious in light of the prior art. 68 In addition, the
breadth of the allowable claims must be commensurate with his
69
disclosure.
To accomplish this task, the PTO must first interpret the claims. As
claims are written for persons of ordinary skill, the PTO interprets the
claims by asking what would a person of skill in the art understand
the claim text to delineate. In this view, the patent applicant is
communicating a boundary of exclusion directly to a person of skill.
Claim interpretation simply asks what that boundary is. There is a
heavy reliance on the plain meaning of the claim language. The
specification is only relevant if the applicant, acting as his own
lexicographer, has imbued a claim term with some idiosyncratic
meaning. Only then does the specification have particular relevance to
interpreting the claims.
As suggested above, many scholars in patent law appear to adopt
this view and have advocated for the procedural implications that flow
from it. In addition, members of judiciary similarly appear to
understand claims in this way. Judge Moore has outlined her views on
the proper procedure for understanding claims. 70 She begins by citing
the bedrock principle that "the claims of a patent define the invention
to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude" and she then
argues that this leads directly to proper procedure. She argues that
"[aipplying these bedrock principles of interpretation, claim terms are
to be given their plain and ordinary meaning to one of skill in the
art." 71 And, she further notes the limited role for the specification. She
notes that "[tihe specification may shed light on the plain and
ordinary meaning" but the "the specification cannot be used to narrow
a claim term - to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning unless the inventor acted as his own lexicographer or intentionally
72
disclaimed or disavowed claim scope."
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
70 See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 137073 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
71 Id. at 1371.
72 Id. Related to this, Judge Rader noted that if claims were construed to be
coextensive with the disclosed invention, then no claim should ever be invalidated for
68
69
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In addition, this outlook also leads to the view that the disclosed
invention is a matter for construction and validity of a claim, and it is
not a consideration for claim interpretation. Judge Moore describes
this dynamic: "If the metes and bounds of what the inventor claims
extend beyond what he has invented or disclosed in the specification,
that is a problem of validity ....It is not for the court to tailor the

73
claim language to the invention disclosed."
Despite its widespread acceptance, there are real problems with this
view. Although Chiang characterizes it as a "key insight," he does
acknowledge that this understanding requires a deeply atextual
reading of the statute. In the first paragraph of § 112, the statute
instructs applicants to describe the "invention." Here, Chiang
understands the invention to be the technological embodiments
created by the inventor. But, when the statute in the very next
sentence uses the same term "invention," Chiang inexplicably tells us
that this term now means something "entirely different." As argued
below, there is not any justification for such atextual reading.
Furthermore, this metes and bounds interpretation of claims is
strained in that it puts delineation of exclusive rights at the center of the
linguistic meaning of claims. Yet, exclusive rights are not even
mentioned at all in 35 U.S.C. § 112. Exclusive rights are only mentioned
much later in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 151. As argued in the
next section, there is an alternative view where the statutory mandate
and the judicial opinions can be read without conflict and without
conflating the meaning and effect of patent claims.

C. Claiming What Was Invented
There is an alternative way to understand patent claims and this
alternative is consistent with the statute as well as judicial descriptions
of claims. In this view, patent claims are understood in the sense of "I
claim to have invented the following." Claim drafters are not delineating
boundaries of exclusion directly. Rather, they are highlighting the
bounds of what they invented. This view leads to a different
understanding of claim meaning and associated patent procedure.
This alternative view is premised on the idea that the invention is an
objective concept that can be articulated by the inventor via the patent
application. 74 When an inventor approaches a patent attorney, the
attorney's job is to follow the instructions set forth in 35 U.S.C. to
failure to provide an adequate written description.
73

Id.

74

See Liivak, Finding Invention, supra note 26, at 103.
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draft a patent application for the inventor. Of course, the attorney
hopes to secure maximal protection for the client but that is a hoped
for legal effect - a matter of claim construction not necessarily
interpretation. 75 By analogy, a tax attorney certainly aims to minimize
tax liability for a client but that does not mean that the tax attorney
can simply fabricate answers to straightforward questions like "what
was the filer's annual income last year."
For patent law, the statutory instructions in 35 U.S.C. § 112 revolve
around one thing, the "invention." The only sensible way to
understand this statutory language is as the things that the inventor
invented. And, that in turn is best understood as the embodiments
that the inventor has conceived and reduced to practice (whether
actually or constructively). As conception and reduction to practice
require considerable detail, a specification that discloses what was
76
invented requires similar detail.
The statutory instructions for the specification first require a detailed
description of the invention and then the specification is concluded by
"particularly and distinctly" pointing out the invention. Because of this
focus, the patent drafter understands that she must first understand
what the inventor has in fact invented, namely what the inventor has
conceived and reduced to practice. 77 The drafter prods the inventor to
disclose not only the details of the preferred embodiment but also all
related variations that solve the same technical problem. All of these
embodiments together form the invention.
Once the attorney grasps the invention in all its permutations, the
attorney is now ready to draft the patent specification including not
only a description of the invention but also how to make and use the
invention. 78 As outlined in § 112(a) that description forms the core of
the specification. The drafter then reads § 112(b) and finds that she is
instructed to conclude the specification "with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the inventor ... regards as the invention." 79 This provision at
first appears odd. Having just described the invention to comply with
§ 112(a), the patentee must claim the invention as well? Despite that
initial appearance of redundancy, it serves a real purpose.
See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
See Liivak, Rescuing Invention, supra note 56, at 10.
77 See Liivak, Finding Invention, supra note 26, at 83-91 (providing examples
where the inventor has not conceived of more than one (or at least a very limited set
of) embodiments).
78 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
79 Id. § 112(b).
75

76
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Consider a typical mechanical invention, a machine. A specification
for that invention will include all the alternative embodiments of the
machine as well as a method for making those embodiments and a
method of using those embodiments. It thus necessarily contains a
method of making a machine, a method of using the machine, and the
machine itself. The machine itself, the method of making it, and the
method of using it all could be patent eligible inventions. Without
clarification we do not know which one is the patent applicant trying
to protect. The claims help resolve this confusion by making clear that
the applicant is claiming the machine as the invention.
Furthermore, claims help in another regard. The purpose of patent
examination is to determine what portion of the disclosed invention is
patentable. In other words, of the properly disclosed invention, what
portion of it is new and non-obvious? Issued claims help make this
clear.80 They are administrative tools that aid in determining what
parts of the disclosed invention qualify as the patented invention. 8'
And, because allowed claims describe the patentable portion of the
disclosed invention, claim text ultimately delineates exclusion.
Exclusion is granted to the "patented invention" and issued claims
help to easily identify the patented invention.8 2 In this view, claims do
not "define" exclusion because they were initially written as requests
for exclusion. Instead claims "define" exclusion because they
circumscribe the patented invention.
Importantly, in this view the whole specification and the claims are
understood to be describing and circumscribing the same thing - the
invention. Therefore, claim interpretation is substantially aided by the
context of the specification. When a judge reaches for the specification
she is simply trying to understand the linguistic meaning of that claim
term in the context for which it was written. The specification is
consulted to understand the context in which the patentee is using a
term. In short, the specification is almost always consulted to interpret
the claim language.
This view of claim meaning provides for coherent understanding
that does not require atextual understandings of the statute. The
statutory command of § 112(b) directs claim interpretation.
Accordingly, with their claim language inventors are highlighting what
they claim to have invented. Once the PTO finds that the applicant did
indeed invent as broadly as claimed, and once the PTO finds the
80 See id. § 271(a) (2012).

81 See Liivak, Rescuing Invention, supra note 56, at 30.
82

§ 271(a).
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claimed invention to be both novel and nonobvious, then the claimed
invention also defines the patentable invention and hence it defines
patent exclusion. Seen in this way the statutory commands and the
judicial statements that claims define exclusion can be understood
coherently.
IIl.

RELEVANCE MOVING FORWARD

The current ambiguity of patent claims must be resolved. It is
hampering our ability to improve the patent system. Most notably, the
ambiguity is adding to the confusion surrounding the proper use of
the specification for understanding patent claims. But, the relevance of
this ambiguity extends much further. Recently, the Supreme Court has
taken up two major cases that deal with patent claims. The Court
tightened the standard for claim indefiniteness and redefined the
proper standard for appellate review of district court claim
constructions. 83 As detailed below, the ambiguity surrounding patent
claims impacts how these new rules should be implemented. And,
although it has yet to reach the Supreme Court, patent law is also
beginning to wrestle with the proper use of functionally defined claim
limitations. This debate also hinges on first resolving this ambiguity.
This section outlines these three new developing areas and shows how
they depend on first understanding what claims represent.
A.

Indefiniteness

Recently, the Supreme Court in Nautilus v. Biosig addressed the
proper standard for determining whether a patent claim was
indefinite. The basis for the indefiniteness requirement is 35 U.S.C. §
112(b), the same statutory language that describes the purpose of
claims generally. It instructs applicants to "particularly and distinctly
point[] out what the inventor regards as his invention." Up until
Nautilus, the Federal Circuit considered a claim invalid for
indefiniteness if the claim was not "amenable to construction" or
"insolubly ambiguous."8 4 This standard was generally seen as a lax
standard that seldom invalidated a claim.
In Nautilus, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit's
standard was too permissive and did not match the statutory
command. In its place the Court held "that a patent is invalid for
83 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835-36 (2015); Nautilus
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
84 Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating
the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention."8 5
For the most part, the Court simply restated the statutory language
but it did add that the claim had to inform with "reasonable certainty."
The Court further noted that, although the statute "mandates clarity,"
the Court understands that "absolute precision is unattainable."8 6 And,
it is here that "reasonable certainty" fits in. The Court stated that "the
certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is
reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter."87
But what exactly is "their subject matter" and what precision is
"reasonable" for that context? The answer depends on the linguistic
purpose of claims. If claims are understood as claiming what was
invented then "reasonable certainty" would likely be set higher than if
claims are understood as claiming exclusion alone. Under the 'what
was invented' view, the object of the claims is the same as the object of
the full specification (i.e. the invention). Having just written the bulk
of the specification and giving a detailed account of the invention in
all its permutations, along with a description of making and using that
invention, it is certainly reasonable for patent law to expect that the
patentee can then claim that same invention with substantial clarity.
To invent something, requires conceiving it.88 This requires having a
"definite and permanent" conception of that invention and how it will
be carried into practice.8 9 As put by Merges and Duffy, "conception
requires rigor" 90 such that the inventor can communicate the
"crystallized [idea] in all of its essential attributes."9 ' If claims are
communicating what an inventor claims to have invented then it is
quite reasonable to demand a high level of precision. If the applicant is
indeed claiming something she invented, then it surely is not onerous
to require her to simply write it down with clarity and precision. 92
815 Nautilus Inc.,

134 S. Ct. at 2124.
Id. at 2129.
87 Id. (quoting Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916)).
88 See Liivak, Rescuing Invention, supra note 56, at 20; see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs.,
Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (the "primary meaning of the word 'invention' in the
Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical
embodiment of that idea").
89 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
90 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 61, at 450.
91 Id.
92 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Oskar Liivak Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 12,
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248)
86
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In contrast, if claims are understood as directly delineating the
subject matter the patentee seeks dominion over, then the level of
reasonable precision is likely to be much lower. In such a system, the
scope of exclusion a patentee might request is not necessarily tied to
the subject matter invented by the applicant. Rather, we might expect
applicants to aim for the amount of exclusion that the patentee thinks
the PTO will allow. This will be less precise than claiming what the
applicant invented. We cannot reasonably expect applicants to provide
exacting certainty in claims when they are engaged in a circular
guessing game about what the PTO might ultimately allow. As patent
law now begins to develop the "reasonable certainty" standard for
indefiniteness, the courts93 need to first address the unresolved
ambiguity in patent claims.
Claims, Context, and Deference to District Court

B.

Similarly, the Supreme Court recently decided Teva v. Sandoz.94 The
Court took the case to consider the standard of appellate review of a
lower court's factual findings in claim construction. The Court held that
claim construction was not exceptional, and, like for other factual
findings, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applied. 95 The Court
held that "[wihen reviewing a district court's resolution of subsidiary
factual matters made in the course of its construction of a patent claim,
the Federal Circuit must apply a 'clear error,' not a de novo, standard of

[hereinafter Liivak Brief]

("[Section]

112 quite reasonably

requires the patent

applicant to simply write down that mental conception. This converts the subjective
inquiry of whether the claimed subject matter was conceived by the inventor into the
objective inquiry of whether the specification can corroborate the invention of the
claimed subject matter."). Despite the precision expected in this view, patentees can
often still claim broadly. When they invent broadly, they can claim broadly. See
Liivak, Finding Invention, supra note 26, at 74. In addition, and in contrast to the views
of many, the patentee can also disclose and claim after arising technology. Id. at 91-98.
93 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014).
Interestingly, a reading of the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Nautilus
appears to support the view that claims are claiming what was invented. In the
opinion, the Court provides some of the pre-history of patent claims. The Court notes
that patent law's first reference to the patent specification required it to "contain[] a
description ...

of the thing or things

.

.. invented or discovered" and the statute later

references these "thing or things" as the "invention." Id. at 2124.
94 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
95 Id. at 836.
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review." 96 Having given the basic rule, the Court went on "to explain
how the rule must be applied in [the context of patent claims] ."97
The Court divided the evidence used for claim construction into two
groups: intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. 98 As to the intrinsic evidence,
namely the patent claims, the specification, and the patent's
prosecution history, "the judge's determination will amount solely to a
determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that
construction de novo." 99 But the Court explained that the intrinsic
evidence would not resolve every issue. "In some cases ... the district
court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to
consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the
background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during
the relevant time period."100 The Court held that such "subsidiary fact[
]finding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal."' 10 1
Though those factual findings are reviewed for clear error, the Court
added that every one of those factual findings is accompanied by a legal
determination that is reviewed de novo. The Court explained that where
a district court resolves a dispute between experts and makes a
factual finding that, in general, a certain term of art had a
particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention, the district court must then conduct
a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would ascribe that
same meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent
claim under review. That is because "[elxperts may be
examined to explain terms of art, and the state of the art, at
any given time," but they cannot be used to prove "the proper
or legal construction of any instrument of writing." 102
The unresolved ambiguity in patent claims directly impacts this
directive. In particular, the Court emphasized that the district court
needs to make the legal determination addressing "whether a skilled
artisan would ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of

96

Id. at 833.

97 Id. at 840.
98 Though not cited by the Supreme Court, this distinction was at the heart of the
Federal Circuit's en banc opinion in Phillips. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

99 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
100 Id.

10, Id.
102 Id. (emphasis removed).
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the specific patent claim under review."1 03 The "context" of a patent
claim depends on what we think claims are communicating.
If we are claiming what was invented, then the object of the claims
and the specification are the same thing (i.e. the invention), then the
specification provides a great deal of context by which to understand
what a claim is trying to communicate. With that view, even though a
district court might have made a subsidiary factual finding about how
some term was understood generally at the time of filing, that factual
finding may be generally less relevant to the ultimate legal
determination because claims are always read in light of the
specification. For example, using the claim term "baffles" from
Phillips, 1°4 even if it was proven that the word "baffles" alone is
understood by persons of skill to include internal structures at any
angle, that factual finding would likely be irrelevant to the ultimate
legal determination of the meaning of claim term "baffle" when read in
light of the specification especially if the term "baffle" is repeatedly
used in the specification to refer to structures at non-right angles. The
contextual usage of claim terms in the specification would govern
even if that claim term in isolation might have a different meaning to
persons of skill. In short, the context of the claim term is always
attached strongly to the specification as both the specification and the
claims are describing the invention. Expert testimony about common
usage of terms that contradicts the contextual usage in the
specification will be harder to leverage as the legal case about its
relevance to claim "context" is lessened.
On the other hand, if claims are intended to communicate exclusion
directly then the specification is less relevant and expert testimony is
more important and the district court will likely make more factual
findings that will be afforded deference by the appellate court. Claim
terms are understood in the "context" of delineating exclusion directly
to person of skill as, accordingly, expert testimony about the plain
05
meaning of a term will be often relevant for claim interpretation.
Unless the specification makes clear that the patentee was
idiosyncratically acting as her own lexicographer, the rest of the
specification is less relevant to understanding the claim term. In this
view, claims communicate exclusion directly to persons of skill and
Id. (emphasis removed).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
105 In this view, the specification discloses the patentee's contribution and as such,
the specification provides a limit for claim scope via the disclosure doctrines but that
is generally construction not interpretation. The specification matters generally to
claim invalidity but not for interpretation.
103
104
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therefore subsidiary factual findings about what those persons would
think are directly relevant. And in such a world, the factual
determination regarding what a person of skill would understand that
claim term to mean has great significance. In other words, though the
relevance of the extrinsic evidence requires a legal determination that
considers claim "context," when understood as delineating exclusion
directly, the extrinsic plain meaning of a term largely divorced from
the specification is quite relevant.
For example, considering the example of Phillips again, if "baffles"
as a factual matter connotes a generic internal structure (irrespective
of angle), then a claim using that term would be interpreted as a
request for exclusion over all things that have that "generic internal
structures." The actual internal structures described in the rest of the
specification are largely irrelevant for interpreting that claim term.
With this world-view of claims, the factual finding is highly relevant
for the proper claim interpretation.
As shown above, understanding the "context" in which claims were
written is critically different between the two views of patent claims
and it impacts how much deference is ultimately granted to district
court claim constructions. When viewed as highlighting what was
invented, the claim necessarily must be read in light of the
specification and subsidiary factual contributions can often be
overridden by inferences based on the specification and intrinsic
evidence. But, if viewed as exclusion directly, then the factual
understanding of the person of skill is largely independent of
inferences from the specification and will generally control ultimate
claim construction. 106
106 Interestingly, as in Nautilus, though the Supreme Court certainly was not
aiming to resolve this ambiguity, the language of the opinion does have some

relevance. For example, the Court described a patent claim as a "portion of the patent

document that defines the scope of the patentee's rights." Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)). And
that they are "aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the bounds to the
grant which it contains." Id. at 837 (citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917)). These passages, when read quickly, seem to
support the notion that claims directly delineate exclusion. But of course, the passages

do not make clear if they are describing the linguistic meaning of claims or only the
legal effect of claims. They are not clear if exclusion is what claims are intended to
communicate or if exclusion is the legal effect of the language. On the other side of
the ledger, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, describes patents as "restrain[ing] others
from manufacturing, using or selling that which [the patent holder] has invented" for
a specified period of time. Id. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis removed)
(quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917)). Here, though it certainly is discussing exclusion, it is clear that the exclusion
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Depending on whether they are communicating requests for
exclusion directly or communicating what was invented, the Court of
Appeals will have less room or more room respectively to find those
factual finding to be irrelevant to the ultimate legal claim construction.
As with Nautilus, the ultimate impact of Teva depends on exactly what
we think patent claims are intending to communicate.
C.

Functional Claiming

Another area where this claim ambiguity will matter is the emerging
debate over functional claiming. 107 The value, purpose, and validity of
functional claiming depend on our basic view of claims. If claims
represent exclusion alone, then functional claiming will be generally
acceptable (though such claims might still be invalidated for being too
broad). Functional claiming enables broad claims to be written very
effectively and, if understood as requests for exclusion, we would want
applicants to have the ability to write claims of varying scope. In
particular, functional claiming is one of the few ways to write claims
that will effectively encompass after arising technology. 108
In addition to generally allowing functional claiming, this view of
claims would also lead to a narrow interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f). This statutory provision instructs the PTO and the courts to
interpret claim limitation that express a "means ... for performing a

specified function" not as literally covering any means that
accomplishes the stated function but instead only those means that are
described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 109 Particularly if
we adopt a policy view that patent scope should often extend beyond
the specification, then, this statutory provision will be understood
quite narrowly and will be applied only where the applicant makes it
crystal clear that they wanted to invoke the narrow coverage of a
extends to things that have been invented.
107 See Liivak Brief, supra note 92, at 20; see also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co.
v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Functionally defined genus
claims can be inherently vulnerable to invalidity challenge for lack of written
description support, especially in technology fields that are highly unpredictable,
where it is difficult to establish a correlation between structure and function for the
whole genus or to predict what would be covered by the functionally claimed
genus."). For a discussion of functional claiming and its impact in software, see Kevin
Emerson Collins, Patent Law's FunctionalityMalfunction and the Problem of Overbroad,
Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH-. U. L. REv. 1399, 1443-44 (2013), and Mark A.
Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of FunctionalClaiming, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 905,
905-06.
108 See Liivak, Finding Invention, supra note 26, at 91.
109 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
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"means plus function" claim limitation. The current view of functional
claiming roughly follows this rough outline. The strictures of § 112(f)
apply only upon use of particular magic words and generally
functional language that avoids the magic "means plus" format is
acceptable and not problematic.
In contrast, if claims represent what the applicant claims to have
invented, then functional claiming is generally more suspect. As the
invention is generally understood as the means conceived to
accomplish some useful end result, unregulated functional claiming
allows applicants to claim the result rather than their particular
solution. For example, functional language would be particularly
inappropriate at the point of novelty 1 0 and when structured as a single
means claims.1
And in so far as § 112(f) is concerned, if applicants claim what they
invented then this provision would be interpreted quite liberally. In
other words, limiting a claim to the disclosed structures would be
appropriate in all cases where functional language is used not just
where the magic words "means for" or "step for" were employed. In
essence, the statutory directive would not just be a special interpretive
regime that applicants could selectively invoke rather it would be a
general directive for interpreting functional claim limitations. And it
accords with the broader notions of interpretation for all claims. All
claim terms are interpreted in light of the embodiments disclosed in
the specification.
As with the ongoing developments from Nautilus and Teva, the
Federal Circuit is starting to address the problems stemming from
functional claiming. 12 Patent law must first consider the basic
interpretive message of claims before we can definitively decide how
to approach functional claiming.
CONCLUSION

Currently there is fundamental confusion over the linguistic
meaning of patent claims. Patent law is confused whether, for
purposes of interpretation, initial claims should be understood as the
request "I'd like exclusive rights over the following things" or the
statement "I claim to have invented the following things." This debate
matters. Patent law has long struggled to precisely determine how the
110 See Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1253, 1255 (2011).
111 See In reHyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
112 See, e.g., Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1344-

45 (Fed. Cir. 2015); AbbVie DeutschlandGmbH & Co., 759 F.3d at 1301-02.
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specification should be used to understand claims. Until this
ambiguity is resolved, that debate is hopeless.
As argued here, it is clear that the only reasonable understanding of
the linguistic meaning of claims is as the statement "I claim to have
invented the following." This is true even though the main legal effect
of patent claims is to demarcate the bounds of a patent's rights of
exclusion. The key is that claims do not define exclusion directly.
Instead they are critical for defining exclusion because claims are
useful tools for understanding what was invented by the applicant.

